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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:
Case No. 940448-CA

V.

:

BRENT ZIEGLEMAN,

:

Priority No. 10

Defendant/Appellant.

:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an interlocutory appeal from an order denying
defendant's motion to suppress in the Fourth Judicial District
Court in and for Juab County, State of Utah, the Honorable Lynn
W. Davis, presiding.

This Court has jurisdiction to hear the

appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (1994).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE PRESENTED
AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
The following issue is presented on appeal:
Did the trial court correctly determine that
defendant's otherwise valid consent was attenuated from what the
trial court characterized as a prior "technical" violation of
law, despite the fact that there was no temporal break or other
intervening circumstance between the improper police conduct and
defendant's consent to search?
A trial court's determination of whether a consent to
search obtained after police misconduct is sufficiently
attenuated from that illegal conduct to be deemed valid is a
question of law that is reviewed for correctness.

State v.

Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1271-1272 (Utah 1993).

A trial court's

findings of fact that underlie its attenuation determination will
not be reversed unless clearly erroneous.

Id.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
The applicable constitutional provisions, statutes and
rules for a determination of this case are as follows:
U.S. Const. Amend. IV:
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not
be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant and his co-defendant, Michael McNaughton1,
were charged with possession of a controlled substance with
intent to distribute, a second degree felony, in violation of
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (1) (a) (iv) (Supp. 1992) (R. 1). Both
defendants filed motions to suppress, which were denied by the
trial court following an evidentiary hearing (R. 88-92, 96-99).
Defendant filed a petition for permission to appeal from an
interlocutory order, and this Court granted defendant's petition
(R. 103-04) .
On appeal, the State conceded that the arresting
officer had exceeded the scope of detention permitted for a
traffic stop by asking defendant whether he had any weapons or
1

Mr. McNaughton has not joined defendant in this
interlocutory appeal. Br. of Appellant at 3.
2

contraband in his car because the facts known to the officer did
not support a finding of reasonable suspicion of drug
trafficking.

The State argued, however, that the officer's

improper question was only a technical violation and that
defendant's subsequent consent to search the vehicle was
therefore not tainted by the prior police illegality.

This Court

accepted the State's concession of error on the scope of
detention issue and remanded the case for further proceedings on
the issue of attenuation (R. 220-21).
On remand, defendant renewed his motion to suppress
before Judge Lynn W. Davis2, and the parties briefed the issue
of attenuation to the trial court. After an evidentiary hearing
and oral arguments, the trial court entered findings of fact and
conclusions of law as well as an order denying defendant's motion
to suppress (R. 293-303, 340). Defendant filed a petition for
permission to appeal the trial court's interlocutory order, and
the State recommended that the petition be granted (R. 312-14).
This Court granted defendant's petition (R. 311).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
At the hearing on defendant's original motion to
suppress, the arresting officer, Utah Highway Patrol Trooper
Lance Bushnell, was the only witness called to testify.
Following the hearing, Judge Ballif entered a signed memorandum
decision, and later, he entered additional findings of fact and
2

Judge Ballif heard defendant's original motion to
suppress. The case was reassigned to Judge Davis because of
Judge Ballifs retirement.
3

conclusions of law (R. 88-92, 96-99).

(Copies of Judge Ballif's

findings of fact and conclusions of law as well as his memorandum
decision are attached hereto as addendum B.)
The facts adduced at the suppression hearing are
recited below in the light most favorable to the trial court's
ruling.

See State v. Delaney, 869 P.2d 4, 5 (Utah App. 1994)

(When reviewing a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress,
appellate courts recite the facts in the light most favorable to
that ruling.).
On July 20, 1991, Trooper Lance Bushnell, a four year
veteran of the Utah Highway Patrol who was certified at
estimating the speeds of motor vehicles, observed a car traveling
in the opposite direction on 1-15 near Nephi (R. 147-150).
Bushnell estimated that the vehicle was traveling at a speed of
approximately seventy-five miles per hour, ten miles per hour in
excess of the posted speed limit (R. 150).
Because the radar gun he was using did not have the
capacity to determine the speed of cars going the opposite
direction across the median, Bushnell decided to cross the median
and pace the vehicle from behind.

Although he allowed the

vehicle to drive further down the road before he crossed the
freeway, defendant -- who was driving the car -- apparently saw
Bushnell cross the median because when Bushnell caught up to the
car it had slowed down to sixty miles per hour -- five miles per
hour under the posted speed limit (R. 150-51, 167-69) .
Bushnell was not able to verify defendant's speed

4

either by pacing or with a radar gun (R. 169) . He therefore
decided to simply warn defendant to slow down (R. 152, 162-65).
Bushnell's decision was in keeping with his policy of issuing
warnings instead of speeding citations in cases in which he is
unable to verify his visual estimate of a vehicle's speed (R.
166).

In the instant case, Bushnell decided to give defendant a

hand signal to keep his speed down (R. 151-52, 171).

Bushnell

pulled along side the vehicle, but neither defendant nor his
passenger would look at Bushnell-

Unable to convey a hand

signal, Bushnell fell back behind the vehicle and then pulled
along side the car one more time to try and attract the attention
of defendant or his passenger (R. 152, 171). Again, neither of
them would look toward the trooper (R. 171).
After making two unsuccessful attempts to issue
defendant an informal warning to slow down via a hand signal,
Bushnell stopped the vehicle to issue a warning citation (R.
152).

Upon stopping the vehicle, the trooper approached

defendant and asked for a driver's license and registration.
Defendant produced a driver's license, but was unable to produce
vehicle registration.

Defendant indicated that he had borrowed

the car from a friend from Minnesota3 named "Bill," but he could
provide no other information about the car's owner (R. 152-53).
As he searched for the registration form, defendant
appeared extremely nervous.
hands were trembling.
3

He was moving very quickly and his

Defendant eventually found an insurance

The car carried Minnesota license plates (R. 152).
5

information form with the name "William Kayler" upon it, which he
gave to the trooper (R. 152-55).
Bushnell began to suspect that the car was stolen
because of defendant's inability to produce a proper vehicle
registration form as well as his inability to provide a full name
of the vehicle's owner or any other information about the owner.
Defendant's nervous behavior, which Bushnell indicated was much
greater than that typically exhibited by other drivers stopped
for traffic violations, served to reinforce Bushnell's suspicion
that something was awry (R. 153, 172-72).

Under these

circumstances, Bushnell decided to request an N.C.I.C. check on
the vehicle to see if it had been reported stolen (R. 179).
The report came back negative and indicated that the
vehicle was owned by a person named "William Kayler," the same
name that appeared on the insurance form that defendant found in
the vehicle (R. 178). However, Bushnell testified that stolen
vehicles are not always promptly listed as having been reported
stolen.

Indeed, although he did not know how long it typically

took officials in Minnesota to post a stolen vehicle report,
Bushnell testified that in California it takes two days for such
a report to be filed (R. 178-80).

Moreover, Bushnell had

personally recovered stolen cars on other occasions -- even
though N.C.I.C. checks had failed to indicate that the vehicle
had been reported stolen (R. 205).4
4

The record is less than clear on the question of exactly
when Bushnell ran the N.C.I.C. check and whether he had received
(continued...)

6

Bushnell returned to the vehicle and asked defendant
where they had been and where they were going.

Defendant

answered that they had been to California and were going back
home to Minnesota (R. 153-54).

Bushnell then asked if there were

any weapons or narcotics in the vehicle.

Defendant said that he

had no knowledge about anything of that sort being in the vehicle
(R. 154). Bushnell followed up his question by asking " [d] o you
mind if we5 look?"

The trial court found that defendant

"unhesitatingly replied[,] 'help yourself'" (R. 98), and
defendant got out of the car (R. 155).
Bushnell then asked the passenger, co-defendant
McNaughton, to get out of the vehicle.

McNaughton got out and

stood behind the car with defendant, out of the lane of traffic
(R. 155).
As McNaughton exited the vehicle, Bushnell asked him
his name.

McNaughton "just grabbed his wallet and started

digging through his wallet" (R. 155). McNaughton's hands were
visibly shaking as he passed over his driver's license three
4

(...continued)
the results before he asked defendant for consent to search the
vehicle. Indeed, in its initial ruling the trial court indicated
only that "[i]t is unclear from the facts whether the officer
asked for consent to search the car while he was waiting for the
results of NCIC, or whether he had already learned the car was
not listed as stolen when he asked for consent" (R. 90).
Nevertheless, based on its subsequently entered findings of fact,
it appears that the trial court determined that Bushnell knew the
results of the check before he asked for consent to search (R.
98). Because of the ambiguity in the record, it cannot be said
that the trial court's finding is clearly erroneous.
5

By "we" Trooper Bushnell was referring to himself and
Deputy Bill Thompkins, who was riding with Bushnell (R. 155).
7

separate times.

Bushnell finally stopped McNaughton and said,

"[i]sn't that [your driver's license] right there?" (R. 156).
McNaughton quickly reached for his license and tried to remove it
from his wallet.

However, because he was moving so quickly and

shaking so badly, McNaughton spilled all the contents of his
wallet onto the ground.

Bushnell asked McNaughton why he was so

nervous, and McNaughton replied that he did not come in contact
with the police very often (R. 156). Bushnell testified that
McNaughton's extreme nervousness served to further reinforce his
suspicion that the two men had stolen the vehicle (R. 182).
As Bushnell began to search the vehicle, he found a
package of "Zig Zag" rolling papers inside a Nike court shoe in
the back seat (R. 156-57).

Bushnell stated that such papers are

typically used to roll marijuana cigarettes, but that they can
also be used for rolling tobacco.

However, the trooper found

neither tobacco nor marijuana in the vehicle (R. 188-89).
Bushnell asked both men if they owned the papers, but neither of
the two claimed ownership (R. 157).
The trooper could not understand why neither would
admit to owning the rolling papers because it is not illegal to
possess such papers (R. 157, 190). The denial of ownership,
coupled with the driver's inability to produce a vehicle
registration form or to identify the owner of the vehicle beyond
stating that his name was "Bill," as well as the extreme
nervousness of both defendant and his companion, caused Bushnell
to suspect not only that the vehicle was stolen, but also that
8

the two might be transporting illegal narcotics. According to
Bushnell, the latter suspicion was also based in part on his
having previously encountered --in

about 3 0 percent of his

prior felony narcotics arrests -- drug traffickers who were
traveling in a vehicle that was either stolen or had been loaned
to them by a third party (R. 177, 193-95).
Bushnell then searched the trunk of the vehicle, but he
found nothing of consequence.

He also asked defendant if he

could look in a duffel bag that was in the trunk, and defendant
said "[g]o ahead" (R. 157). Again, the trooper found no
contraband (R. 157).
Bushnell then searched under the hood of the car.
There he saw an oil cloth wedged between the battery and interior
wall of the right front fender.

Bushnell felt the cloth and

could tell that it contained something that felt like a brick of
narcotics similar to those he had seized on other occasions (R.
157-60, 192-93).

Further inspection revealed that the cloth

covered a brown grocery bag that contained a kilogram of cocaine
(R. 160-61).
Defendant and McNaughton were then arrested and charged
with possession of cocaine with intent to distribute (R. 159).
After defendant successively appealed the denial of his
first motion to suppress, the case was remanded for further
proceedings on the issue of whether defendant's consent was
sufficiently attenuated from Bushnell's improper questions about
narcotics trafficking (R. 220-21).
9

(A copy of this Court's

opinion in which it remanded defendant's case for consideration
of the State's attenuation argument is attached hereto as
addendum C.)

Judge Davis held a supplemental evidentiary hearing

on defendant's renewed motion to suppress and entered findings of
fact based on the testimony adduced at that hearing (R. 293-303,
348).

(A copy of Judge Davis' ruling as well as the order

denying defendant's motion to suppress is attached hereto as
addendum A.)

Those findings are reproduced below verbatim:

1. Officer Lance Bushnell stated that as of
the date of the stop [of defendant's
vehicle], July 20, 1991, there was no written
or verbal policy of his department, the Utah
Highway [P]atrol, proscribing an inquiry of a
driver of a vehicle whether there were any
weapons, drugs or narcotics in the vehicle.
2.
Officer Bushnell testified that
department policy allowed him to ask personal
questions at a stop; the questions are not
scripted.
3. Officer Bushnell testified that it was
his practice to routinely ask whether there
was any contraband in stopped vehicles.
Ziegleman and McNaughton were not singled out
for any reason.
4. Officer Bushnell further testified that
his law enforcement practices are guided by
P.O.S.T. training, by legal advice from the
county attorney, from reading court
decisions, and from departmental directive.
5. Officer Bushnell testified that at the
time of the stop, he was not aware of any
law, statute, or court case which would have
prohibited, or called into question, his
inquiry regarding contraband and a request to
search.
6. He further testified that he, therefore,
proceeded under the law at the time and that
his procedure and behavior were proper and
that he acted in conformity with the legal
10

advi[ce] he had been given.
7. Lastly, he testified that he has now
abandoned this procedure in light of new case
law decisions handed down since this stop and
upon the advice of counsel.
R. 295-296.
The trial court then reviewed the case law as it
existed at the time Bushnell stopped defendant's vehicle.

It

concluded that there was "no Utah court ruling on the issue of
whether the officer's questions [about weapons and contraband]
was in violation of the defendant's rights" and that "Bushnell's
conduct was arguably permissible" under case law from the Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals (R. 299). Finally, the trial court
stressed that Bushnell had abandoned his practice of routinely
asking whether there were narcotics or weapons in a stopped
vehicle as a result of this Court's opinion in State v. GodinaLuna, 826 P.2d 652 (Utah App. 1992) (R. 301). The trial court
noted, however, that "[n]o one would suggest that law enforcement
officers should be clairvoyant enough to divine future appellate
decisions" (R. 301).
In light of its findings of fact, the trial court
characterized Bushnell's improper questioning as only a
"technical violation" because Bushnell's error "d[id] not rise to
the level of willful or even negligent misconduct" (R. 3 02).

The

trial court then concluded that the deterrent purpose underlying
the Thurman attenuation doctrine was not implicated in cases
involving mere technical violations and that "the absence of a
temporal break or other intervening circumstances between the
11

asking of the improper questions and defendant's consent to
search [was therefore] inconsequential" (R. 3 00-3 01).
Accordingly, the trial court denied defendant's motion to
suppress on the grounds that defendant's consent was not obtained
by police exploitation of a prior illegality (R. 302).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Although Bushnell exceeded the scope of detention
permitted for a routine traffic stop when he asked defendant
whether there were any weapons or narcotics in the vehicle, that
misconduct was only a technical violation because Bushnell's
questioning was permissible under then existing case law.
As the Utah Supreme Court recently made clear in State
v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256 (Utah 1993), the policy objective
underlying the attenuation analysis is deterrence of police
misconduct.

Because Bushnell's conduct was in keeping with then

existing case law as it was explained to him by the local county
attorney and at police training seminars, Bushnell's action
cannot be deemed a flagrant act of misconduct or even negligent
misconduct.

Rather, as the trial court determined, Bushnell

committed only a "technical violation" that became apparent
because of case law handed down after the stop of defendant's
vehicle.

He has since changed his conduct in an effort to comply

with that new case law.

The deterrent rationale underpinning

Thurman's attenuation analysis is not implicated under such
circumstances.

This Court should therefore uphold the trial

court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress on the ground
12

that defendant's consent to search was valid because it was not
obtained by police exploitation of a prior illegality.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
ALTHOUGH TROOPER BUSHNELL LACKED REASONABLE
SUSPICION OF NARCOTICS TRAFFICKING, AND
THEREFORE EXCEEDED THE PERMISSIBLE SCOPE OF
DETENTION BY ASKING WHETHER DEFENDANT HAD ANY
WEAPONS OR CONTRABAND IN HIS VEHICLE,
SUPPRESSION IS NOT WARRANTED IN THIS CASE
BECAUSE DEFENDANT'S CONSENT TO SEARCH THE
VEHICLE IS VALID UNDER THURMAN.
Although the State conceded on defendant's 1993 appeal,
and this Court agreed, that the facts known to Bushnell at the
time he asked defendant whether he was carrying any weapons or
narcotics did not support a reasonable suspicion of such
activity, suppression of the evidence discovered in the
consensual search of the vehicle driven by defendant is not
warranted.

Rather, because the search of the vehicle can be

sanctioned under State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684, 688 (Utah 1990),
as clarified in State v. Thurman. 846 P.2d 1256, 1262-64 (Utah
1993), there is "no legitimate justification for depriving the
prosecution of reliable and probative evidence."

Brown v.

Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 611-12 (1975) (J. Powell, concurring).
Accordingly, this Court should affirm the denial of defendant's
motion to suppress.
A.

The Validity Of Defendant's Consent Under The
Voluntariness Prong of Thurman.
Under Thurman, the inquiry into whether a consent to

search is lawfully obtained following illegal police action must
13

focus on two factors: (1) whether the consent was voluntary, and
(2) whether the consent was obtained by police exploitation of
the prior illegality.

In this case, Trooper Bushnell's

uncontroverted testimony established, and the trial court found,
that defendant "unhesitatingly" consented to the search of his
vehicle (R. 98). The trial court deemed defendant's consent
voluntary because there was no evidence of duress or coercion (R.
99).

Defendant has not challenged the trial court's finding of

voluntary consent on appeal, and there is ample case law to
support its ruling.

See, e.g., State v. Sepulveda, 842 P.2d 913,

918-919 (Utah App. 1992) (officer's uncontroverted testimony
demonstrated defendant voluntarily consented to search of his
vehicle).
issue.

The first prong of Thurman, therefore, is not at

There remains, however, the question of whether

defendant's consent was sufficiently attenuated from the prior
illegality.

As demonstrated below, suppression is not warranted

because it cannot be said that Bushnell "exploited" the prior
illegality in order to obtain defendant's consent.
B.

Arroyo's Attenuation/Exploitation Prong As
Clarified In Thurman.
The Utah Supreme Court recently clarified the analysis

to be conducted under the exploitation (or attenuation) prong of
Arrovo.

State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1262-64 (Utah 1993).

Significantly, the Court began its discussion of the exploitation
prong with an unequivocal statement of the policy consideration
that underlies Arrovo:
Arroyo's primary goal was to deter the police
14

from engaging in illegal conduct even though
that conduct may be followed by a voluntary
consent to the subsequent search.
The deterrence rationale discussed in
Arroyo is grounded in the United States
Supreme Court's decision in Brown v.
Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975). There,
Justice Powell, in a concurring opinion
joined by now Chief Justice Rehnguist, made
it clear that the analysis used to invalidate
consent on the basis of exploitation was
grounded firmly in the deterrent purposes of
the exclusionary rule. Id. at 608-12.
Justice Powell's admonition that the
exploitation analysis "always should be
conducted with the deterrent purpose of the
Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule sharply in
focus," id. at 612, has become a cornerstone
of search and seizure jurisprudence. See 4
Search & Seizure § 11.4(a), at 373: see also
Anthony G. Amsterdam, Search, Seizure, and
Section 2255: A Comment, 112 U. Pa. L. Rev.
378, 390 (1964) [hereinafter Amsterdam].
Thurman, 846 P.2d at 1263.
Having identified the deterrent purpose of the
exclusionary rule as the underpinning of the Arroyo exploitation
prong, the Thurman Court reiterated the factors to be considered
by courts:

"[!)] 'the purpose and flagrancy of the official

misconduct,' [2)] the 'temporal proximity' of the illegality and
the consent, and [3)] 'the presence of intervening
circumstances.'"

Id. at 1263 (citations omitted).

The Thurman

Court then discussed each factor in greater detail, emphasizing
the deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule throughout its
discussion.
Clearly, the "purpose and flagrancy" factor is the most
significant of the three because it is "directly related to the
deterrent value of suppression."
15

Id. at 1263 (citations

omitted).

As such, the first task a court should complete under

the exploitation prong is to characterize the nature and degree
of the prior illegality based on a continuum of "flagrancy" and
"egregiousness."

Id.

See also State v. Bello, 871 P.2d 584

(Utah App.), cert, denied,

883 P.2d 1359 (Utah 1994) (post-

Thurman case in which this Court began its attenuation analysis
by evaluating police misconduct on scale of purposefulness and
flagrancy).
To put the Thurman continuum into perspective, it must
first be recognized that

n/

[t]he deterrent purpose of the

exclusionary rule necessarily assumes that the police have
engaged in willful, or at the very least negligent, conduct which
[sic] has deprived the defendant of some right.'"

Id.

(quoting

Brown, 422 U.S. at 612 (Powell, J., concurring) in turn quoting
Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 447 (1974)).

Further, "[t]he

nature and degree of the illegality will usually be inversely
related to the effectiveness of time and intervening events to
dissipate the presumed taint.

Thurman, 846 P.2d at 1264.

Thus, at one end of the continuum is police misconduct
that is "flagrantly abusive, [such that] there is a greater
likelihood that the police engaged in the conduct as a pretext
for collateral objectives," or instances in which "the purpose of
the misconduct was to achieve the consent[.]"
omitted).

Id. (citations

In such cases, court "will require a clean break in

the chain of events between the misconduct and the consent to
find the consent valid."

Id.

In the absence of such a clean
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break, "suppressing the resulting evidence will have a greater
likelihood of deterring similar misconduct in the future."

Id.

(footnote and citation omitted).
Next in line to purposeful or flagrant misconduct on
the Thurman continuum is negligent police misconduct.

Although

"less critical to the dissipation of the taint," time and
intervening circumstances are still significant "where it appears
that the illegality arose as the result of negligence[.]"

Id. at

1264.
At the other extreme of purposeful and flagrant
misconduct are instances where "the police had no 'purpose' in
engaging in the misconduct[.]

[F]or example, if the illegality

arose because [a court] later invalidated a statute on which the
police had relied in good faith--suppression would have no
deterrent value."

Id.

(citations omitted).

In Brown, Justice

Powell characterized this type of conduct as a "technical"
constitutional violation.

422 U.S. at 611-12 (citation and

internal quotation marks omitted).

In such instances, time and

other intervening events are inconsequential because, regardless
of such considerations, suppression is not warranted.

That is

because the "underlying premise [of the exclusionary rule], is
lacking, [and] the deterrence rationale of the exclusionary rule
does not obtain[.]"

Id. at 612. Accordingly, absent at least

negligent police conduct, evidence should not be excluded because
there is "no legitimate justification for depriving the
prosecution of reliable and probative evidence."
17

Id.

Relying on the State's interpretation of Thurman's
attenuation analysis as articulated above (R. 298), the trial
court determined that Bushnell committed only a "technical
violation" of the law and that defendant's otherwise valid
consent was not the product of police exploitation of a prior
illegality (R. 300-302) . Accordingly, the trial court held that
suppression of the evidence obtained during a consensual search
of defendant's vehicle was not warranted because no deterrent
purpose would be advanced under the facts presented.

As

demonstrated below, the trial court's ruling should be affirmed.
C.

The Trial Court Properly Held That
The Illegality That Occurred In
This Case Constituted Only A
Technical Violation Of Law.

Recognizing that the policy underlying Arroyo is the
deterrent value of the exclusionary rule, the trial court held
that suppression would be inappropriate in this case because,
even though Bushnell exceeded the permissible scope of detention,
his actions did not constitute flagrant misconduct or a
purposeful violation of the law (R. 3 02)•

Indeed, because

Bushnell's questioning was arguably proper under the law in
effect at the time of the stop, the trial court determined that
Bushnell's conduct did not even rise to the level of negligence
(id.).

On that basis, the trial court properly characterized the

trooper's mistake as a "technical" violation that did not warrant
suppression of reliable and probative evidence (id.).
In State v. Godina-Luna, 826 P.2d 652 (Utah App. 1992),
this Court made clear that an officer, as part of a routine
18

traffic stop, may not legally ask the question regarding
narcotics and weapons that Bushnell asked in this case. However,
at the time that Bushnell stopped defendant, Utah courts had not
resolved that issue.

The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals,

however, had issued several panel decisions indicating that an
officer could ask such question during the course of even routine
traffic stops.
In United States v. Walraven, 892 F.2d 972, 976 (10th
Cir. 1989), and United States v. Diaz-Albertini, 772 F.2d 654,
659 (10th Cir. 1985), cert,

denied,

494 U.S. 822 (1987), the

panels held that such questions, even though unsupported by
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, were permissible
during a routine traffic stop.

Similarly, in United States v.

Walker, 933 F.2d 812, 814-16 (10th Cir. 1991), the panel
explained that an extended detention of the defendant to ask such
questions, unsupported by reasonable suspicion of criminal
activity, violated the fourth amendment.

See also United States

v. Werkinq, 915 F.2d 1404 (10th Cir. 1990); United States v.
Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512 (10th Cir. 1988).

However, the Walker

panel dropped the following footnote in its opinion:
Under the reasoning of United States v.
Morales-Zamora, 914 F.2d 200 (10th Cir.
1990), our determination that defendant was
unlawfully detained might be different if the
questioning by the officer did not delay the
stop beyond the measure of time necessary to
issue a citation. For example, this case
would be significantly changed if the officer
asked the same questions while awaiting the
results of an NCIC license of registration
inquiry.
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933 F.2d at 816 n.2. Accordingly, under then existing case law
from the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, questions such as the
one posed by Bushnell were proper so long as the suspect was not
detained any longer than necessary to complete the purpose of the
stop.
Bushnell was familiar with the rulings from the Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals because he had been told about them in
police training sessions and by the local county attorney (R.
295).

He attempted to act in conformity with those requirements,

and, as the trial court found, Bushnell's conduct in this case
did in fact conform to the training and legal advice he had
received (R. 301). Specifically, the trial court held that
Bushnell could have detained defendant based on defendant's
failure to produce proper vehicle registration and also to
investigate his suspicion that the vehicle was stolen (R. 2993 00).

Neither of these issues were contested by the defendant

below, nor has he attacked the trial court's determinations on
appeal.

That decision is well measured because the trial court's

ruling is amply supported by case law.

See, e.g., State v.

Robinson, 797 P.2d 431, 435 (Utah App. 1990) (once a driver has
produced evidence of entitlement to use the vehicle, he must be
allowed to proceed, without being subject to further delay by
police for additional questioning).
Because Bushnell's question did not extend the period
of detention longer than was otherwise necessary, his conduct was
proper under then existing case law from the tenth circuit -20

including Walker.6

It logically follows, and the trial court

found, that Bushnell's "misconduct" in this case was properly
characterized as only a "technical violation" on the Thurman
continuum of flagrancy and purposefulness (R. 302) . Indeed, once
Bushnell learned that the question he asked defendant in this
case was not considered a proper part of a routine traffic stop
(a change prompted by this Court's opinion in Godina-Luna) he
voluntarily changed his conduct to comply with the newly
announced legal standard (R. 301). As the trial court found, no
deterrent purpose would be served by suppressing the narcotics
recovered from defendant's vehicle in light of the facts
presented (R. 302).
D.

Given That Bushnell's "Misconduct" Was A
Here Technical Violation Resulting From
A Change In Case Law, The Remaining
Thurman Factors of Temporal Proximity
and Intervening Circumstances Are
Inconsequential.

With respect to the temporal proximity and other
intervening circumstances elements of the Thurman attenuation
prong, the State conceded below that there was no break in time
or other intervening circumstance between Bushnell's improper
question and defendant's consent to search (R. 239, 242).
However, as the trial court recognized, "the absence of a
6

Indeed, since the time of the stop that occurred here,
Utah Courts have recognized that the "running of a warrants check
in the course of a traffic stop is permissible, so long as it
does not significantly extend the period of detention beyond that
reasonably necessary to effectuate the original purpose of the
stop." State v. Figueroa-Solorio. 830 P.2d 276, 280 (Utah App.
1992). Accord State v. Higgins, 884 P.2d 1242, 1245 n.2 (Utah
1994).
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temporal break or other intervening circumstance between
[Bushnell's] asking of the improper question and defendant's
consent to search is inconsequential" because the police
illegality was only a technical violation (R. 300-301 (citing
Brown, 422 U.S. at 611-12)).
Under Thurman and Brown, where the police illegality is
merely a technical violation that does not even rise to the level
of negligence, the deterrence rational of the exclusionary rule
is not implicated.

See generally. Brown, 422 U.S. at 611-12.

The trial court recognized that fact and held that "this case is
akin to one in which 'the illegality arose because [a court]
later invalidated a statute on which the police had relied in
good faith[;] suppression would [therefore] have no deterrent
value'" (R. 300) (quoting Thurman, 846 P.2d at 1264 (citation
omitted)).

Because the trial court's ruling on this issue is

consistent with Thurman and Brown, its ultimate determination
that defendant's consent was not the product of police
exploitation of prior police misconduct should be affirmed.
STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT AND
PUBLICATION OF OPINION
This case centers around the interpretation of the Utah
Supreme Court's opinion in Thurman.

Under Thurman. the State

believes no break in time or other intervening circumstances
between illegal police conduct and a defendant's consent to
search is necessary to find attenuation in cases where the
illegal conduct was a mere technicality not even rising to the
level of negligence.

In contrast, defendant argues that under
22

Thurman the lack of a break in time or intervening circumstance
automatically renders any consent invalid.
implicates important policy considerations.

Each party's position
The State believes

that many of these policy considerations, as well as the
viability of each party's proposed interpretation of Thurman, can
best be tested by pressing questions from this Court.

The State

therefore requests oral argument.
The State further requests that this case be decided in
a fully reasoned published opinion.

Trial courts continue to

struggle with the attenuation doctrine, and only a few cases
involving the attenuation doctrine have been decided since
Thurman was handed down.

Indeed, Utah's appellate courts have

never reviewed a finding of attenuation in a case where the prior
police illegality was deemed a mere technical violation of law.
Accordingly, in the relatively undeveloped area of attenuation
case law, this case presents a matter of first impression in
Utah.

This Court's decision should therefore be published in

order to provide necessary guidance to trial courts on this
evolving and important area of search and seizure law.
CONCLUSION
Trooper Bushnell's conduct was proper under the case
law in place at the time he stopped defendant's vehicle.

In

recognition of that fact, the trial court properly determined
that Bushnell's misconduct was only a technical violation that
did not warrant suppression of reliable and probative evidence in
the face of defendant's voluntarily given consent to search.
23

In

keeping with the principles espoused in Thurman, this Court
should affirm the trial court's denial of defendant's motion to
suppress.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED t h i s

/o^tiay

of May, 1 9 9 5 .

JAN GRAHAM
Attorney General
TODD A. UTZMGE&
Assistant Attorney General
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Addendum A
Judge Davis' Ruling and Order
Denying Defendant's 1993 Motion to Suppress
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
JUAB COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH

Ruling on Defendant's Motion Suppress
Plaintiff,
CASE NO. 82E

vs.

JUDGE: LYNN W.DAVIS

BRENT LEE ZIEGELMAN
Defendant.
Judge George E. Ballif, now retired, denied defendant's motion to suppress in a
ruling dated January 14, 1992. That ruling was appealed to the Utah Court of Appeals. In a
Memorandum Decision dated September 9,1993, the Utah Court of Appeals reversed the
decision of the trial court based upon several concessions by the State of Utah. The Court of
Appeals remanded the case for determination as to whether the consent to search was valid
under Thurman. The Remittitur was filed with the Clerk of the District Court on October 18,
1993.
On November 29, 1993, a conference call was conducted by the court. The
purpose was for the court to determine if the parties wished a further evidentiary hearing or
whether they wished the court to make the Thurman analysis from the record of the
suppression hearing conducted on November 15, 1991, before Judge Ballif. The parties did
not want to foreclose any options, so the court requested briefing and scheduled a hearing
date to take evidence and to entertain legal argument. Counsel for defendant filed a
"Request for Further Evidentiary Hearing and Demand for Speedy Trial" on November 19,
1993.
A hearing was scheduled on January 28, 1994. The State of Utah submitted
extensive briefing on January 3, 1994. Defendant relied upon his original Memorandum of
Points and Authorities in support of the Motion to Suppress Evidence which was filed on

$p&

October 15, 1991.
Subsequent to the hearing, defendant filed a Supplementary Memorandum on March
31, 1994. The State then filed "State's Response to Defendant's Supplemental
Memorandum" about April 4, 1994. During the pendency of this case, counsel have alerted
the court of the status of various cases now pending before Utah's appellate courts. The
court, having entertained the arguments of counsel, reviewed the various memoranda, and
otherwise being fully advised in the premises, now enters the following:
Ruling
I.
Issue

The sole issue before the court is whether the consent to search in this traffic stop
was valid under a Thurman analysis. Because Judge Ballif found no prior illegality, he did
not address the validity of defendant's consent under the second prong of the Arroyo Thurman test. The Court of Appeals therefore remanded this case for the sole purpose of
having this court evaluate:
"Whether the consent was obtained by police expectation of the prior illegality...or,
in other words, whether the 'taint' of the Fourth Amendment valuation was
sufficiently attenuated to permit introduction of the evidence." State v. Ziegleman.
unpublished memorandum decision dated September 9, 1993, at 2
This court wonders why the Utah Court of Appeals remanded this case.
Admittedly, the questions of whether a defendant's consent was given voluntarily and
whether this consent was obtained by police exploitation of the prior illegality, are factual
questions. But certainly there appears in the record sufficient findings before the court in
order to apply the Thurman analysis without the necessity of remand. Defendant argues that
the Court of Appeals remanded the case in order for the trial court to dismiss the case. That
position is not well taken. The Utah Court of Appeals could have suppressed the evidence
and/or dismissed the case, if it desired. Was it remanded in order to take additional evidence
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on the consent issue and have the trial court make the Thurman analysis? The Thurman
analysis is a legal analysis and the facts have already been established. The reason for the
remand is somewhat confusing to this court. Nevertheless, the court scheduled a
supplementary evidentiary hearing. This court has no intention of disturbing the facts as
previously determined by Judge George Ballif at the suppression hearing conducted by him.

n
Facts
The facts as established by Judge Ballif at the suppression hearing are not in dispute
as to the consent issue. This court conducted the supplementary hearing.
This court, therefore, specifically adopts the Findings of Fact of Judge Ballif dated
March 24, 1992, consisting of paragraphs 1-8. In addition, this court specifically finds the
following from the supplemental evidentiary hearing:

1. Officer Lance Bushnell stated that as of the date of the stop, July 20, 1991,
there was no written or verbal policy of his department, the Utah Highway patrol,
proscribing an inquiry of a driver of a vehicle whether there were any weapons, drugs or
narcotics in the vehicle.
2. Officer Bushnell testified that department policy allowed him to ask personal
questions at a stop; the questions are not scripted.
3. Officer Bushnell testified that it was his practice to routinely ask whether there
was any contraband in stopped vehicles. Ziegleman and McNaughton were not singled out
for any reason.
4. Officer Bushnell further testified that his law enforcement practices are guided
by P.O.S.T. training, by legal advice from the county attorney, from reading court decisions,
and from departmental directive.
5. Officer Bushnell testified that at the time of the stop, he was not aware of any
law, statute, or court case which would have prohibited, or called into question, his inquiry
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regarding contraband and a request to search.
6. He further testified that he, therefore, proceeded under the law at the time and
that his procedure and behavior were proper and that he acted in conformity with the legal
advise he had been given.
7. Lastly, he testified that he has now abandoned this procedure in light of new
case law decisions handed down since this stop and upon advice of counsel.

m
Discussion
For the most part, the State's analysis of State v. Arroyo , 796 P.2d 684 (1990),
and State v. Thurman , 846 P.2d 1256 (1193), is accurate. Determining whether a
defendant's consent to a search following illegal police action is valid under the Fourth
Amendment, requires inquiry into (1) whether the consent was given voluntary, and (2)
whether the consent was obtained by police exploitation of the prior illegality. Thurman at
1262.
A
The First Prong Voluntariness of the Consent
After the officer asked the driver if there were any weapons, drugs or narcotics in
the vehicle, the driver said there were not any. The officer then asked for consent to
search. Mr. Ziegleman unhesitantly replied "help yourself." (See findings of Judge Ballif,
No 6.)
The officer then searched the interior of the vehicle and found nothing of substance.
The officer then asked for consent to search the trunk, which consent was again given by
the driver. Again no contraband was found. Officer Bushnell then searched the hood area
where the cocaine was discovered. (See findings of Judge Ballif, No 6) This court
emphasizes that consent was sought and granted in two instances as the level of intrusion and
search increased. The response in each instance was affirmative.
The State argues that the first prong is met because the defendant "never alleged

that his consent was not given voluntarily.* State's Memorandum at 10. However, "(t)he
prosecution bears the burden of proving that the defendant's consent was voluntary."
Thurman at 1263 (citations omitted). The only proof offered by the State is that "Trooper
BushnelTs uncontroverted testimony was that defendant in fact consented to the search."
State's Memorandum at 11 (citing Sepulveda1).
Despite the State's assertion that "(t)he first prong... is not at issue," I$L* "whether
the requisite voluntariness exists depends on the totality of all the surrounding circumstancesboth the characteristics of the accused and the details of police conduct." Thurman at 126263 (citations omitted). Whether the defendant's consent was actually a product of his or her
free will is a factual question. "The analysis used to determine voluntariness is the same
without regard to whether the consent was obtained after illegal police conduct." I& at
1262. In the case at hand, this issue is not as clear cut as the state asserts.
The burden never shifts to the defendant to show that the consent was involuntary.
The burden always rests with the state to show that the consent was voluntary. The state
argues that the defendant has never alleged that his consent was involuntary.

But Thurman

holds that the prosecution bears the burden of proving that the consent was given voluntarily.
State v. Thurman. 846 P.2d 1256, 1263 (Utah 1993). Given the state's burden of proof on
this issue, it may be inappropriate for the state to require the defendant to allege involuntary
consent; rather whether the consent was given voluntarily must be part of the state's
affirmative burden of proof.
This court, after consideration of the totality of the circumstances, concludes that
the consent to search was freely and unequivocally given. The court relies upon the
following in reaching that conclusion:
1. Officer Lance Bushnell was the only witness called by the State and his
testimony was undisputed;
2. Defendant did not choose to attend the supplemental hearing to dispute the
officer's version;
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3. The initial consent was given unhesitatingly; the defendant did not delay in his
response nor did he equivocate;
4. This court considers a "help yourself" response to Officer BushnelTs inquiry to
be unequivocal,absent any testimony to the contrary;
5. There is no testimony that the defendant revoked or attempted to revoke his
consent at any stage.
6. The evidence is uncontroverted that the defendant reconfirmed his consent as the
search proceed beyond the initial interior search. Officer Bushnell asked the
defendant if he could look in a duffel bag that was in the trunk, and the defendant
said "go ahead."
B.
The Second Prong Whether the Consent
was Obtained by Police Exploitation of the Prior Illegality
It is uncontested that Officer Bushnell, after making the stop, asked to search the
vehicle. It is the defendants position that the consent obtained is vitiated because the
detention unlawfully continued after any lawful and proper purpose had passed.
The state's interpretation of the second prong as set forth in Thurman is correct.
Thurman does seem to base the need for suppression of evidence obtained from consent
following illegal police action on the deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule. Three
factors are to be considered to determine whether or not to permit the introduction of the
evidence resulting from consent after a police illegality—(1) "the purpose and flagrancy of the
official misconduct," (2) the "temporal proximity of the illegality and the consent," and (3)
"the presence of intervening circumstances. "Id. at 1263.
The state claims that the Thurman court analysis of the first "purpose and
flagrance" factor is controlling in the present case. The court analyzes this factor as follows:
The deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule necessarily assumes that the police
have engaged in willful, or at the very least negligent, conduct which has deprived
the defendant of some right. Thus, if the police had no "purpose" in engaging in
the misconduct-for example, if the illegality arose because we later invalidated a
statute on which the police had relied in good faith-suppression would have no
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deterrent value
M, at 1263-64 (citations omitted). If this is the case, then the court seems to indicate that
further analysis is not required. The state claims that the present case is akin to this
scenario.
This case does not involve good faith reliance upon a statute which was later
invalidated. There were, at best, conflicting cases in the Tenth Circuit and no Utah court
ruling on the issue of whether the officer's questions was in violation of the defendant's
rights. The instant case, though distinguishable on the facts, is sufficiently akin to
"statute/revocation" scenario to merit the same analysis and the same result. While it may
be a close call, it appears to this court that the state's emphasis on the "purpose and
flagrancy" factor is accurate because of the facts brought out at the supplementary hearing.
The state has de-emphasized the other important factors of temporaral proximity and the
presence of intervening circumstances. But the state argues that because uiere was no clear
court pronouncements regarding these types of questions asked by the arresting officer, his
improper questioning was only a "technical" violation. This argument, thought fairly
complex, appears to be sound in light of Justice Powell's concurring opinion in Brown v.
Illinois. 422 U.S. 590, (1975).
This court agrees with the state's position that Officer Bushnell could have
detained defendant to further investigate defendant's failure to produce a vehicle registration
form or evidence of his entitlement to use the vehicle. Cf. Robinson, 797 P.2d at 435 (once
a driver has produced evidence of entitlement to use the vehicle, he must be allowed to
proceed, without being subject to further delay by police for additional questioning).
Consequently, under Walker Bushnell's conduct was arguably permissible because it did not
delay the stop beyond the time necessary to investigate the issue of whether defendant had
permissive use of the vehicle.
Indeed, since the time of the stop that occurred here, the Court of Appeals has
similarly recognized that the "running of a warrants check in the course of a traffic stop is

permissible, so long as it does not significantly extend the period of detention beyond that
reasonably necessary to effectuate the original purpose of the stop. "Steve v. FigueroaSolorio.

830 P.2d 276, 280 (Utah App. 1992).
Two contemporaneous decisions from the California courts reflect a split similar to

that evidenced in the decisions from the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals Compare People
v.Lusardi. 228 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 1, 280 Cal. Rpter. 80, 81 (Cal. Super. 1991) ("Officers
making a proper traffic (stop) cannot, on mere hunch, properly ask for consent to search (;)
the consent obtained is vitiated because the detention unlawfully continued after any lawful
and proper purpose has passed"); with People v. Galindo. 229 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 1529,
218 Cal. Rptr. 155, 158 (Cal. App. 1991) (Officer's post-citation inquiry of defendant which included whether there were any guns or drugs in the car and request for permission
to search car—was proper).
This court further agrees with the state's position, under the facts of this case, that
Officer Bushnell could have detained defendant's vehicle based on defendant's failure to
produce proper vehicle registration. He also could have continued to investigate his
suspicion that the vehicle was stolen. Utah had yet to address the issue of whether it was
permissible for an officer, in the course of a routine traffic stop, to ask the question posed by
Bushnell. In light of the conflicting opinions from other courts on the issue presented, it
cannot be said that the trooper's asking defendant whether there were any weapons or
narcotics in the vehicle constituted flagrant misconduct or even a negligent violation of the
law. Moreover, the encounter was not merely a routine traffic stop, but instead involved
defendant's failure to produce a vehicle registration form and to demonstrate permissive use
of the vehicle beyond asserting that a friend identified only as •Bill1' had loaned him the car.
Since this case is akin to one in which "the illegality arose because (a court) later
invalidated a statue on which the police had relied in good faith (;) suppression would
(therefore) have no deterrent value." Thurman. 846 P.2d at 1264 (citation omitted).
Consequently, the absence of a temporal break or other intervening circumstance between the

asking of the improper question and defendant's consent to search in inconsequential. Sfi£
generally. Brown. 422 U.S. at 611-12.
This court fully recognizes that its principal focus on the "purpose and flagrancy of
the official misconduct" may result in an additional remand to further examine the "temporal
proximity of the illegality and the consent" factor as well as "the presence of intervening
circumstance" factor. Nonetheless, this court has principally focused on "the purpose and
flagrancy of the official misconduct" factor because of the unique facts established at the
supplemental evidentiary hearing. Consider:
1. At the time of the stop, July 20, 1991, there was no written or verbal policy of
the Utah Highway Patrol, or the officer's department, proscribing an inquiry of a
driver of a vehicle whether there were any weapons, drugs or narcotics in the
vehicle.
2. Departmental policy allowed Officer Bushnell to ask personal questions at the
time of a traffic stop; the questions were not scripted.
3. The questions posed to the driver of this vehicle were those routinely asked in
his law enforcement practice. This driver was not singled out for any reason.
4. Officer Bushnell adjusts his law enforcement practices based up training, advice
from the county attorney, based upon Utah Highway Patrol directives and based
upon court decisions.
5. He was not aware through these educational and training efforts as of July 20,
1991, that any law, statute, court case prohibited or called into question his inquiry
regarding contraband in a vehicle or a request to search. As of July 20, 1991, he
acted in conformity with his training and legal advice.
6. Lastly, and most importantly, it is stressed that Officer Bushnell has abandoned
this procedure in light of court decisions handed down since July 20, 1991. State v. GodinaLuna 826 P.2d 652 (Utah App. 1992). No one would suggest that law enforcement officers
should be clairvoyant enough to divine future appellate decisions.
It is clear that the suppression of the evidence in this case would, therefore, have
absolutely no deterent effect whatsoever because this officer's routine has long since
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comported with new caselaw which gave him guidance. This court concludes that since there
were no clear court pronouncements as of July 20, 1991, regarding these type of questions
asked by this officer, his improper questioning was only a •technical" violation. A technical
violation does not necessarily require suppression of the seized cocaine, because it is clear
that here would be no deterrent effect. Officer Bushnell long ago abandoned these inquiries
when the position was clarified. His practice has been consistent with law. The deterrence
rationale discussed in Arroyo is mooted by his volunteer abandonment of the challenged
inquiry. No deterrent purpose in implicated or served in this case by suppressing the
cocaine.
This court characterizes the nature and degree of the prior illegality as technical and
not flagrant or egregious. It does not rise to the level of willful or even negligent
misconduct even though Officer Bushnell exceeded the permissible scope of detention.
Decision
Based upon the above facts and discussion, Officer Bushnell could have properly
detained the defendant to verify his entitlement to utilize the vehicle even though he exceeded
the scope of detention when he asked Mr. Ziegleman whether there were any weapons or
narcotics in the vehicle. As of July 20, 1991, that inquiry was not proscribed by Utah
caselaw, by statute, or by departmental policy and was, therefore, arguably proper under the
law as of that date.
Under the reasoning of Arroyo, as recently "clarified" by the Utah Supreme Court
in Thurman. defendants volunteer and unequivocable consent to search was not obtained by
law enforcement exploitation of a prior illegality. In light of the discussion above, there
would be absolutely no deterrent effect accomplished by suppressing the cocaine seized from
the vehicle.
Defendant's motion to suppress is hereby denied and the clerk of the court is
instructed to set this case for jury trial forthwith.
Dated this

day of May, 1994.

3<a

COURT

cc: counsel

^ A ^

TODD A. UTZINGER (6047)
Assistant Attorney General
JAN GRAHAM (1231)
Utah Attorney General
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah
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vs.
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For the reasons stated in the Court's May 27, 1994
"Ruling on Defendant's Motion to Suppress," defendant's motion to
suppress should be and hereby is DENIED.
Dated this

day of July, 1994.
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
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UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
**********

Pat P. Greenwood.CIerk

S T A T E OF UTAH

Plaintiff,

Case Number:

vs.

RULING

BRENT ZIEGLEMAN AND MICHAEL
MCNAUGHTON

GEORGE

E.

82-E

BALLIF,

JUDGE

Defendants.
**********

This matter came before the Court on defendants' motions
to suppress cocaine, which was found in the hood of a car
defendants were driving. Defendant Michael John McNaughton filed
his motion on August 26, 1991 and defendant Brent Ziegleman filed
his motion on September 6, 1991.
The Court, having proceeded with an evidentiary hearing and
also having considered the motions and memoranda, now enters its:
RULING.
The Court denies defendants' motions in that the officer
was justified in making the initial stop of the vehicle, he had a
reasonable, articulable suspicion sufficient to detain defendants,
and he obtained a valid consent to search to vehicle. In the event
that either the initial stop or subsequent detention are flawed,
then under a fourth amendment search and seizure analysis the issue
of standing and of a reasonable expectation of privacy would arise.
However, in this case defendants have not established that they had
such an expectation, especially in .the hood area of the vehicle.
1.

Oeputy

2.
POINT ONE—THE OFFICER WAS JUSTIFIED IN MAKING THE INITIAL STOP
The Utah courts have held that a police officer may stop
an automobile for a traffic violation committed in his presence,
State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972 (Utah App. 1988), and that an officer
conducting a routine traffic stop may request a driver's license
and vehicle registration, conduct a computer check, and issue a
citation.

State v. Robinson. 797 P.2d 431 (Utah App. 1990).

In

this case the officer, who was certified at estimating the speed of
vehicles, believed that there had been a speeding violation.

He

testified that he attempted to warn defendants of this, but because
they would not look at him, he pulled them over to relay this
warning.
It should be noted that if defendants' lack of eye contact was
the cause of the initial stop for speeding, it was only due to the
fact that the officer had been unable to warn defendant Ziegleman
about his excessive speed by giving hand signals.

This behavior

did not, in and of itself, lead the officer to believe that there
was more serious criminal activity going on. Although the officer
considers nervousness and shifty eye movements as evidencing guilt
in certain circumstances, those behaviorisms in the later part of
this investigation only served to reinforce other findings as the
investigation continued.
POINT TWO—THE OFFICER WAS JUSTIFIED IN DETAINING
SUBSEQUENT TO THE INITIAL STOP

DEFENDANTS

In Robinson, the Utah Appellate Court held that once an
officer has obtained a valid driver's license and evidence of

3.
entitlement to use the vehicle, the driver must be allowed to
proceed on his way.

Here the driver, Brent Ziegleman, could not

produce a registration for the vehicle, and the only entitlement
to use the car was his claim that his friend "Bill" had loaned him
the car. He could provide no further information about "Bill."
In State v, Deitman. 739 P.2d 616 (Utah 1987) it was stated
that an officer may seize or detain a person if the officer has an
"articulable suspicion11 that the person has committed or is about
to commit a crime.

Here, the officer has testified that he

suspected that the car had been stolen. Therefore, he detained the
defendants in order that he could check with NCIC to see if the
car had been stolen.
POINT THREE—THE OFFICER OBTAINED A VALID CONSENT TO SEARCH THE
VEHICLE
It is unclear from the facts whether the officer asked for
consent to search the car while he was waiting for the results from
NCIC, or whether he had already learned the car was not listed as
stolen when he asked for consent. In any event, it is undisputed
that Ziegleman replied, unhesitatingly, "help yourself.11

This

seems to be voluntary consent and, in fact defendants have not
alleged any police coercion or duress, but claim the search is
invalid under a "fruit of the poisonous tree" analysis. However,
the initial stop was valid, t£e subsequent detention was valid,
and the contraband was discovered under the hood of the car
pursuant to a valid consent to a search, and thus it is admissible.

96

4.
POINT FOUR—DEFENDANTS HAVE NO STANDING TO OBJECT TO A SEARCH OF
THE HOOD AREA
The foregoing analysis assumes that defendants had standing to
object to the search, pursuant to a fourth amendment search and
seizure analysis. However, in the event that the initial stop, the
subsequent detention or the search were flawed in some manner, the
issue does arise whether defendants had standing, or had a
reasonable expectation of privacy in the hood area, to begin with.
According to Utah case law, the legitimate expectation of
privacy test is a fact sensitive and not a bright line test. State
v. Grueber, 776 P.2d 70 (Utah App. 1989). In State v. Taylor, 169
Utah Adv. Rep. 62 (Utah App. September 12, 1991) , it was held that
a defendant can have a legitimate expectation of privacy if he is
the owner or is in possession of the property with the permission
of the owner, and that "in order to be sufficient for fourth
amendment purposes, a subjective expectation of privacy must be one
society is prepared to recognize as reasonable."
In this case, defendants admitted they were not the owners of
the vehicle, could produce no registration for it, and could not
produce evidence that permission had been given to them by the true
owner to use the car.

All they could say is that "Bill", about

whom they could give no details, had loaned them the car. The only
circumstance implying permissive use of the car was that they were
in possession of the car.

This is not sufficient to establish a

reasonable expectation of privacy.
Furthermore, even if defendants had such an expectation in the

?/

5.
passenger compartment of the vehicle, they most likely did not have
a subjective expectation of privacy in the area under the hood of
the vehicle.

Pursuant to Taylor, this is certainly not an

expectation that society would recognize as reasonable, when they
were not the owners of the vehicle and have not established that
they had the permission of the true owner to use the vehicle.
Dated at Provo, Utah this

1*4 day of January, 1992.

BY THE COURT

cc:

Donald J. Eyre, Jr.
W. Andrew McCullough

#?

C.*>* c! Dfctrtci Court, Jueb toutnhi
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Donald J. Eyre Jr., No. 1021
Juab County Attorney
125 North Main Street
Nephi, Utah 84648
Telephone: 623-1141

IN THE DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR JUAB COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
vs.

:

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

:
Criminal No. 82-E

BRENT ZIEGLEMAN and
MICHAEL McNAUGHTON,

:

Defendants.

:

The above entitled matter came before the Court for hearing
upon the defendants Motion to Suppress on November 15, 1991. The
defendant, Brent Ziegleman, was present and represented by his
attorney,

W.

Andrew

McCullough,

and

the

defendant,

Michael

HcNaughton, was present and represented by his attorney, Milton T.
Harmon.

The State of Utah was represented by Donald J. Eyre Jr.,

Juab County Attorney.
The Court having heard the evidence introduced by both the
State of Utah and the defendants and having reviewed the Memorandum
of Law submitted by the parties and being fully advised in the
premises and the Court having previously entered its Ruling dated
1

January 14, 1992, now makes the following:
flNPJNGS OF FACT
1. On July 20, 1991 on 1-15 within Juab County, Utah, Trooper
Lance Bushnell, a four year veteran of the Utah Highway Patrol,
observed a motor vehicle in the area of Nephi, and visually
estimated the speed to be in excess of 70 m.p.h., approximately 75
m.p.h., but was unable to obtain a radar reading on the vehicle.
The officer had received training and certification in estimating
of speeds.
2.

The officer turned and followed the vehicle to obtain a

paced speed, but the vehicle had slowed and was now traveling 60
m.p.h..

He then pulled alongside the vehicle with the intent of

giving the driver a hand signal to slow down.

Neither the driver

nor the passenger would look towards him so he could signal them
to slow down. The officer then stopped the vehicle with the intent
of giving the driver a warning concerning his speeding.
3.

The driver of the vehicle was the defendant, Brent Lee

Ziegleman, with one other passenger in the vehicle, the defendant,
Michael McNaughton.
4.

Upon stopping the vehicle, the officer approached the

driver and asked for a driver's license and registration.

The

driver produced a driver's license, but was unable to produce a
registration.

The driver claimed the ownerfs name was ,fBilltf and
2

he was a friend and he had borrowed the car, but could give no
further information concerning his name or where he lived.

While

the driver searched for the registration, he appeared to be
extremely nervous with the hands trembling.

The occupants had no

written authorization or anything that gave them the right to be
in possession of the vehicle.
5.

The officer ran the vehicle through the NCIC computer to

determine if it was reported stolen.

The request came back

negative, but the officer continued to investigate the possibility
of a stolen vehicle, because of his past experience of finding
stolen vehicles not listed on NCIC as stolen.
6.

The officer then asked the driver if there were any

weapons, drugs or narcotics in the vehicle. The driver said there
was not any.

The officer then asked for consent to search, Mr.

Ziegleman unhesitatingly replied "help yourself".
7. The officer then searched the interior of the vehicle and
found nothing of substance. The officer then asked for consent to
search the trunk, which consent was again given by the driver.
Again no contraband was found therein. The officer then search the
hood area.

Between the right front fender and the battery was an

oil cloth covering a brown grocery sack with a kilogram of cocaine
contained therein.
8. Both defendants were then arrested for possessing cocaine
3

?r

with the intent to distribute.
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact the Court makes the
following:
CONCLUSIONS OF IAW
1.

The stop of the defendants' vehicle by Trooper Bushnell

for speeding based upon his visual estimate was lawful based upon
reasonable suspicion of a violation of state law.
2.

The continued detention of the defendants after the

initial stop for speeding, was justified based upon the defendants
inability

to produce a registration

for the vehicle or any

authority to be in possession of the vehicle.
3.

The defendant, Ziegleman, voluntarily consented to a

search of the vehicle by the officer without any coercion or duress
by the officer.
4. Neither defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy
to the hood area of the subject vehicle, and therefore did not have
standing to object to a search of that area of the vehicle.

5. Both defendants1 Motions to Suppress should be denied.
Dated this

1 ^ > day of

2&

c^p^c^^^^h:

>**&

district Judge
/
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Donald J. Eyre Jr.f No. 1021
Juab County Attorney
125 North Main Street
Nephi, Utah 84648
Telephone: 623-1141

IN THE DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR JUAB COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
VS.
BRENT ZIEGLEMAN and
MICHAEL McNAUGHTON,
Defendants.

:

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS1
MOTIONS TO SUPPRESS

:

Criminal No. 82-E

:

The above entitled matter having come before the Court upon
both defendants1 Motions to Suppress for hearing on November 15,
1991 before the Honorable George E. Ballif, sitting as Judge
thereof.
represented

The

defendant,

by bis

Brent

Ziegleman,

attorney, W. Andrew

was

present

McCullough,

and

and
the

defendant, Michael McNaughton, was present and represented by his
attorney, Milton T. Harmon.

The State of Utah was represented by

Donald J. Eyre Jr., Juab County Attorney.
The Court having previously entered its Ruling dated January
14, 1992, and its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Defendants1

1

/00

Motions to Suppress are denied.
Dated this

£.4^

day of 74£4iSwJ?

, 1992

g.^f^g

^District Jud

/oi

Addendum C
Court of Appeals' Decision In
Defendant's 1993 Interlocutory Appeal

SF1 "I"1-""11!
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
•-

<si-»*e of

I/Hi,'

.
^_ _
>^^/&^^
p/Mary T. Noonan

MEMORANDUM DECIsffeft 0 ^ 00 "*
(Not For Publication)

Jtah

! I "i" 1 : i ff and Appellee,
Case No. 920344-CA

v.
Brent Ziegleman,

(September

Defendant and Appellai 1 t.

Fourth District, Juab county
The Honorable George E. Ballif
w # Andrew McCullough, Orem, for Appellants
Jan Graham and Todd A. Utzinger, Salt Lake
Appellee

I'LM ir> I'mi'j*- I i "n

eenwood, and Russon.

tidge °

j way of an it i n t e r l o e u t o r y a p p e a l , d e f e n d a n t challeiiijii h Mi i,"
court's denia] of his motion to suppress evidence.
The trial coi ir t held that (1) defendant was legally stopp
for speeding; (2) continued detention after the stop was
justified; and (3) defendant voluntarily consented to a search
the vehicle. Alternatively, the trial court ruled that (4)
defendant lacked standing to challenge the search of the vehicle,
On appeal, defendant challenges all four of these rulings.
1 „ The Stop
The trial cour t found the stop was la wful based on the
officer's reasonable suspicion of a violation of state law. The
officer testified that he stopped defendant to issue him a
warning citation, after having visually estimated the speed of
defendant's vehicle to be 75 m.p.h. Since there is evidence to
support the trial court's finding, \ #e I iphold the validity of the
stop

2.

Continued Detention

After having verified that the vehicle had not been reported
stolen, the officer asked defendant whether there were any
weapons or narcotics in the vehicle. On appeal, the State
concedes that this question exceeded the scope of detention for a
routine traffic stop and that the question was unrelated to the
issue of whether the vehicle was stolen. The State therefore
concedes "that the continued detention of defendant violated the
fourth amendment." Because of this concession, we reverse the
trial court's determination that continued detention was
justified.
3.

Consent

In view of the State's concession that the consent was
obtained only after an illegal police activity, the court's
finding of consent is now incomplete. The trial court, on
remand, must address "^whether the consent was obtained by police
exploitation of the prior illegality' . . . or, in other words,
*whether the %taint' of the Fourth Amendment violation was
sufficiently attenuated to permit introduction of the evidence.'"
See State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1263 (Utah 1993) (citations
omitted).
4.

Standing

The State also concedes that defendant has standing to
challenge the search of the vehicle. Because of this concession,
we reverse the trial court's alternative holding that defendant
lacked standing.

920344-CA

2

CONCLUSION
I.
•„ i. the State's concessions, the decision ui I he
trial cc
*s reversed and the case is remanded for a
determination as to whether the consent to search was witlnl under
Thurman.

Russell W. Bench, Judge

WE CONCUR:

Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge

Leonard H. Russon, Judge

1, the undersigned, Clerk of the Utah Court of Appeals,
do hereby certify that the foregoing is a full, true and
correct copy of an original document on file in the Utah
Court of Appeals. In testimony whereof, I have set my
hand and affixed the seal of the Cci
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